import Manifest from './shared/manifest.md';
- Threat: An AI agent executing code might hallucinate destructive
sudocommands or attempt to modify system-level configurations. - Mitigation: The AI agent operates within a Distrobox container with a non-privileged user and a mapped workspace (
~/.local/share/wtg-workspace). The atomic root filesystem is read-only, preventing any accidental or malicious modification of the host OS even if the agent attempts to usesudo.
- Threat: Malicious code injected into the OS image during the build process.
- Mitigation:
- Cryptographic Signing: Every build is signed using
cosignand the keys are managed via GitHub Secrets. - SLSA Build Provenance: We implement SLSA Build Provenance and Artifact Attestations via
actions/attest-build-provenance. This provides a cryptographically verifiable link between the final OCI image and the specific GitHub Action run that produced it. - Automated Dependency Updates:
dependabotis configured to scan and update GitHub Actions and thenpmecosystem for the documentation site weekly, ensuring all upstream components are current. - Automated Updates: The
pullapp (if configured) ensures that upstream components are kept up-to-date with the latest security patches.
- Cryptographic Signing: Every build is signed using
- Threat: Isolated containers accessing hardware they shouldn't.
- Mitigation: Hardware passthrough is explicitly limited to
/dev/driand/dev/kfdvia the declarativedistrobox.ini, ensuring the agent can only access the GPU/NPU for acceleration while remaining isolated from other system-level devices.
The decision to use a strictly immutable host (bluefin-dx) with zero host-level CLI/GUI packages minimizes the attack surface. Any development tool or agent must exist within a container, ensuring that the core OS remains in a "known-good" state at all times. Our Test-Driven Infrastructure (TDI) mathematically proves these security constraints are met before any image is published.
The following governance rules are enforced by the repository administrator to maintain the integrity of wtgOS:
- Branch Protection (main):
- Require a pull request before merging.
- Require approvals from CODEOWNERS.
- Require status checks to pass before merging (Linting, SLSA Attestations).
- Require linear history.
- Require signed commits.
- Access Control:
- Least-privilege access for all collaborators.
- Mandatory 2FA for all administrative accounts.
- Audit Logs:
- Weekly review of repository audit logs for suspicious activity.