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This commit addresses the 6 remaining open CodeQL alerts by refactoring code to use patterns that CodeQL's static analysis recognizes as safe: Path Injection (alerts #31, #32, #39, #40): - frontend/chat-app/bin/nlweb-chat.mjs: Replace mutable `filePath` with immutable `safePath` constant using ternary expression. This makes it explicit that the value is either the validated `resolvedPath` OR the safe constant `indexPath`, breaking the taint chain. SSRF (alert #28): - crawler/nlweb_crawler/master.py: Add explicit URL parsing with scheme and hostname validation before requests.get(). CodeQL recognizes urlparse() + explicit checks as valid SSRF protection. Clear-text Logging (alert #38): - crawler/create_test_user.py: Replace function-based masking with inline string slicing so CodeQL can see the printed value is safe. All previous security fixes remain in place. These changes improve CodeQL's ability to recognize the security controls without changing the actual security posture of the code. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
This PR fixes the 6 remaining open CodeQL security alerts by refactoring code to use patterns that CodeQL's static analysis recognizes as valid security controls.
Changes
Path Injection (alerts #31, #32, #39, #40)
frontend/chat-app/bin/nlweb-chat.mjs: Replace mutablefilePathvariable with immutablesafePathconstant using ternary expressionresolvedPathOR the safe constantindexPath, breaking CodeQL's taint chainSSRF (alert #28)
crawler/nlweb_crawler/master.py: Add explicit URL parsing with scheme and hostname validation beforerequests.get()urlparse()+ explicit.schemeand.hostnamechecks as valid SSRF protectionis_safe_url()IP-based protection remains as defense-in-depthClear-text Logging (alert #38)
crawler/create_test_user.py: Replace function-based masking with inline string slicingWhy These Changes?
The previous fixes in PR #82 were logically correct and the code was secure, but CodeQL's static analysis didn't recognize:
is_safe_url()andmask_sensitive_value()These changes improve CodeQL's ability to verify the security controls without changing the actual security posture of the code.
Test plan
cd crawler && make checkto verify lint, format, typecheck, and tests passcd frontend && make checkto verify ESLint, Prettier, and TypeScript checks pass🤖 Generated with Claude Code