fix(deps): update all dependencies - #304
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This PR contains the following updates:
3.5.0→3.6.03.3.1→3.4.03.10.0→3.12.03.2.5→3.2.82.24→2.293.13.0→3.16.00.8.12→0.8.150.9.12→0.10.25.11.0→5.14.45.11.0→5.14.42.17.2→2.22.22.17.2→2.22.22.17.2→2.18.92.17.2→2.2233.3.0-jre→33.7.1-jre1.1.0→1.2.03.26.3→3.27.7jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation
CVE-2026-54512 / GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm
More information
Details
jackson-databind'sPolymorphicTypeValidator(PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains<),DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric()validates only the raw container class name (the substring before<) against the configured PTV.If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via
TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical()and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example
java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget>when onlyjava.util.ArrayListis allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check;com.evil.Gadgetis loaded viaClass.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.
Impact
BasicPolymorphicTypeValidatorconfigured with name-prefix allow rules.TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.
Proof of Concept
Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:
Malicious payload (
Wrapper.valueisObjectwith@JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}On vulnerable versions,
com.evil.EvilGadgetis instantiated and itscmdproperty is set, despite onlyjava.util.ArrayListbeing allow-listed. On2.18.8/2.21.4/3.1.4the deserialization throwsInvalidTypeIdExceptionbefore instantiation.Variant payloads (all bypass an
ArrayList/HashMapallow-list):java.util.ArrayList<Evil>java.util.HashMap<Evil,String>java.util.HashMap<String,Evil>java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>>java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]>Patches
Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit
434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions forObject(wildcard resolution) andEnumtypes.PolymorphicTypeValidatorwas added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
jackson-databind has an array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)
CVE-2026-54513 / GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f
More information
Details
Summary
BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray()allowlists any array type based only onclazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built withallowIfSubTypeIsArray()plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permitsEvilType[]even thoughEvilTypeis not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist.Impact
Applications using
BasicPolymorphicTypeValidatorwithallowIfSubTypeIsArray()as a safeguard get no protection for concrete array component types; an attacker controlling JSON can instantiate non-allowlisted types via an array wrapper, re-opening the gadget-instantiation risk PTV is meant to prevent.Affected / Patched (verified via
git tag --contains)>= 2.10.0, < 2.18.8-> fixed in 2.18.8>= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4-> fixed in 2.21.4>= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4-> fixed in 3.1.4PolymorphicTypeValidatorwas added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.Severity / CWE
Maintainer: significant. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs); related CWE-502.
Upstream fix
FasterXML/jackson-databind#5981; fix PR #5983 (
24529da), 2.18 backport PR #5984 (01d1692). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.Credits
Omkhar Arasaratnam (@omkhar) - finder.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
jackson-databind has case-insensitive deserialization bypasses per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties
CVE-2026-54515 / GHSA-5jmj-h7xm-6q6v
More information
Details
Summary
In
BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property@JsonIgnorePropertiesexclusions are applied by_handleByNameInclusion(), producing acontextualdeserializer whoseBeanPropertyMaphas the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by@JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds fromthis._beanProperties(the original, unfiltered map) instead ofcontextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property_handleByNameInclusionhad just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again.Impact
An application that both enables case-insensitive matching and relies on per-property
@JsonIgnorePropertiesto keep a field unwritable can have that field set from untrusted JSON (mass-assignment-style write).Affected / Patched
Will be fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1 and 3.1.4.
Severity / CWE
Maintainer: minor. Reporter: Moderate. CWE-915.
Upstream fix
FasterXML/jackson-databind#5962 (PR #5964,
0e1b0b2), milestone 3.1.4. Released 2026-06-04.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
jackson-databind: InetSocketAddress deserialization triggers eager DNS resolution (SSRF)
CVE-2026-54514 / GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5
More information
Details
Summary
JDKFromStringDeserializerconstructedInetSocketAddresswithnew InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing anInetSocketAddressfield issues an attacker-chosen DNS query duringreadValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix usesInetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect.Impact
An attacker controlling JSON deserialized into an
InetSocketAddress-bearing type can force outbound DNS lookups for attacker-chosen hostnames at deserialization time (SSRF / DNS-based out-of-band interaction / internal-resolver probing), purely from binding.Affected / Patched (verified via
git tag --containson1f5a103)>= 2.18.0, < 2.18.8-> fixed in 2.18.8>= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4-> fixed in 2.21.4>= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4-> fixed in 3.1.4Severity / CWE
Maintainer: minor. Reporter: LOW. CWE-918 (SSRF).
Upstream fix
FasterXML/jackson-databind#5951 ("Improve InetSocketAddress deserialization"). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.
Credits
Omkhar Arasaratnam (@omkhar) - finder.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
jackson-databind: @JsonIgnore on a Record property is bypassed with a PropertyNamingStrategy
CVE-2026-59888 / GHSA-3pjw-73gf-8qr5
More information
Details
Summary
For Java Records,
POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals()records a@JsonIgnore-annotated component under its original implicit name before_renameUsing()applies thePropertyNamingStrategy. After the rename,_ignoredPropertyNamesstill holds only the pre-rename name, so_ignorablePropsis built from the stale key. The renamed JSON key passesIgnorePropertiesUtil.shouldIgnore()and is assigned to the Record's constructor parameter, defeating the@JsonIgnore.Impact
A Record using a naming strategy that relies on
@JsonIgnoreto keep an internal/privileged component out of deserialization can have that component set from the wire via its renamed key (e.g. a role/flag controlled by an untrusted client).Affected / Patched (verified via
git tag --contains)>= 2.15.0, < 2.18.8-> fixed in 2.18.8 (backportc7c6783)>= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4-> fixed in 2.21.4>= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4-> fixed in 3.1.4 (#5974,baa2cdf)Severity / CWE
Maintainer: minor. Reporter: Moderate. CWE-915; related CWE-345.
Credits
Omkhar Arasaratnam (@omkhar) - finder.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
AssertJ has XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability when parsing untrusted XML via isXmlEqualTo assertion
CVE-2026-24400 / GHSA-rqfh-9r24-8c9r
More information
Details
An XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability exists in
org.assertj.core.util.xml.XmlStringPrettyFormatter: thetoXmlDocument(String)method initializesDocumentBuilderFactorywith default settings, without disabling DTDs or external entities. This formatter is used by theisXmlEqualTo(CharSequence)assertion forCharSequencevalues.An application is vulnerable only when it uses untrusted XML input with one of the following methods:
isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence)fromorg.assertj.core.api.AbstractCharSequenceAssertxmlPrettyFormat(String)fromorg.assertj.core.util.xml.XmlStringPrettyFormatterImpact
If untrusted XML input is processed by the methods mentioned above (e.g., in test environments handling external fixture files), an attacker could:
file://URIs (e.g.,/etc/passwd, application configuration files)Mitigation
isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence)has been deprecated in favor of XMLUnit in version 3.18.0 and will be removed in version 4.0. Users of affected versions should, in order of preference:isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence)with XMLUnit, orisXmlEqualTo(CharSequence)orXmlStringPrettyFormatterwith untrusted input.XmlStringPrettyFormatterhas historically been considered a utility forisXmlEqualTo(CharSequence)rather than a feature for AssertJ users, so it is deprecated in version 3.27.7 and removed in version 4.0, with no replacement.References
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:L/SC:H/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
spotify/fmt-maven-plugin (com.spotify.fmt:fmt-maven-plugin)
v2.29Compare Source
v2.28Compare Source
v2.27Compare Source
v2.25Compare Source
What's Changed
Full Changelog: spotify/fmt-maven-plugin@2.24...2.25
jacoco/jacoco (org.jacoco:jacoco-maven-plugin)
v0.8.15Compare Source
v0.8.14: 0.8.14Compare Source
New Features
Fixed bugs
Fixed handling of exceptions in chains of safe call operators in Kotlin (GitHub #1819).
Non-functional Changes
v0.8.13: 0.8.13Compare Source
New Features
inlinefunctions (GitHub #1670).inlinefunctions withreifiedtype parameter (GitHub #1670, #1700).JvmSyntheticfunctions (GitHub #1700).getEntriesgenerated by the Kotlin compiler for enum classes is filtered out during generation of report (GitHub #1625).JvmOverloadsannotation are filtered out (GitHub #1768).Fixed bugs
Non-functional Changes
IllegalArgumentExceptionoccurs during reading of zip file (GitHub #1833).ronmamo/reflections (org.reflections:reflections)
v0.10.2Compare Source
reflections-0.10.2
v0.10.1Compare Source
reflections-0.10.1
known issue #351: deprecated scanners are using wrong index name :( which results in empty query results. will be solved in next release. workaround/solution: migrate to the new
Scannersv0.10Compare Source
reflections-0.10 refactor
known issue #337: annotation not marked with
Retention(RUNTIME)will be excluded because of an exceptionrevinate/assertj-json (com.revinate:assertj-json)
v1.2.0Compare Source
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