claude-ops follows semantic versioning. Security patches are backported one major version behind the current release.
| Version | Supported | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.x | Yes (current) | Active development; patches land here first. |
| 0.7.x | Yes (backport) | Security fixes only until 0.9.0 ships. |
| < 0.7 | No | Please upgrade. |
If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:
- Do NOT open a public GitHub issue.
- Email:
info@lifecycleinnovations.limited - Include: description, reproduction steps, affected version, and impact assessment.
Expected response time: we acknowledge within 48 hours and aim to ship a fix or mitigation within 14 days. We will coordinate a disclosure timeline with you and credit you in the release notes (unless you prefer to remain anonymous).
- Skills under
claude-ops/skills/ - Agents under
claude-ops/agents/ - Shell scripts under
claude-ops/bin/ - Setup wizard (
claude-ops/skills/setup/,bin/ops-setup-*) - Background daemon (
ops-daemon, services:wacli-keepalive,memory-extractor,briefing-pre-warm) - Telegram MCP server (
claude-ops/telegram-server/) - Plugin hooks (PreToolUse, Stop) and plugin rule enforcement (
CLAUDE.md) plugin.json/marketplace.jsonuserConfig handling
The following are outside the plugin's security boundary:
- User-supplied credentials in
userConfig— these live in Claude Code's own settings store; see Claude Code's security policy. - Third-party CLI tools shipped or wrapped by the plugin, including
wacli(WhatsApp),gog(Google workspace CLI), the Linear MCP, the Sentry MCP, the Gmail MCP connector, and the Google Calendar MCP connector. Report issues to those projects upstream. - Vendor APIs (Stripe, RevenueCat, Shopify, Klaviyo, Meta, GA4, Search Console, Bland AI, ElevenLabs, Groq, AWS). We consume their APIs; we do not operate them.
- The user's own AWS account, infrastructure, and IAM policies —
infra-monitoronly reports on what the user's credentials can already access.
- No sandboxing beyond Claude Code's worktree isolation. The plugin runs with the user's full shell permissions. Only the
triage-agentruns withisolation: worktree; every other skill and agent executes under the same UID and filesystem access as Claude Code itself. - Private repositories referenced.
@auroracapital/gogand some internal registry examples reference private repos. Install paths that require them will fail gracefully, but users need their own access credentials; the plugin does not embed any. - WhatsApp via
wacliuses a QR-paired session.wacliexchanges messages over WhatsApp's own E2E-encrypted protocol, but the session state on disk (pairing keys, message history, app state keys) is not encrypted at the plugin layer. Treat~/.wacli/as sensitive. - No telemetry, no phone-home. The plugin does not emit analytics, crash reports, or usage pings. All network traffic is either (a) to services the user explicitly configured credentials for, or (b) to
api.anthropic.comvia Claude Code itself.
- Secret scanning —
.gitleaks.toml, GitHub secret scanning, and push protection enabled on the repo. - No secrets in source — tokens live in the OS keychain, Doppler, a password manager, or the user's
userConfig; never in tracked files. - Credential scrubbing in CI —
tests/test-no-secrets.shruns on every commit and blocks real names, emails, phones, tokens, store URLs, and/Users/...paths (seeCLAUDE.mdRule 0). - Encrypted cookie handling — browser cookie extraction (Slack
xoxd-, etc.) uses the browser's own keychain key and never persists cleartext cookies to disk. - File permissions — all plugin-generated temp files are created with
umask 077(mode0600). - Destructive-action gating —
CLAUDE.mdRule 5 requires explicit per-actionAskUserQuestionconfirmation before any deletion, stop, scale-down, history rewrite, or auto-renewal cancellation. - Plugin rule enforcement —
CLAUDE.mdat plugin root codifies Rules 0–5 (privacy, question limits, command delegation, skip behavior, background defaults, destructive-action confirmation) and overrides any conflicting instruction in individual skills.
- Privacy and Security wiki page — full breakdown of every credential scan source, what the daemon touches on disk, and the plugin's no-telemetry stance.
- Plugin Rules wiki page — the six hard rules every skill must follow.
- Daemon Guide — what
ops-daemonruns and how to inspect it.