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azure entra ID escalation
jbfeldman-dd dc827c2
tighten docs
jbfeldman-dd 8a22f65
another round of doc revision
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tweaks
jbfeldman-dd d798ee5
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Merge branch 'main' into azure-privesc-user-access-admin
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Enhance docs
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98
...k-techniques/azure/azure.privilege-escalation.root-user-access-administrator.md
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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| @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ | ||
| --- | ||
| title: Elevate to User Access Administrator at Root Scope | ||
| --- | ||
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| # Elevate to User Access Administrator at Root Scope | ||
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| Platform: Azure | ||
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| ## Mappings | ||
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| - MITRE ATT&CK | ||
| - Privilege Escalation | ||
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| ## Description | ||
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| Elevates the current principal to the User Access Administrator role at root scope (/), | ||
| by abusing the "Access management for Azure resources" capability available to Global Administrators in Entra ID. | ||
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| This technique allows a Global Administrator to gain control over all Azure subscriptions and management groups | ||
| in the tenant, enabling arbitrary role assignments across all Azure resources. | ||
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| <span style="font-variant: small-caps;">Warm-up</span>: None | ||
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| <span style="font-variant: small-caps;">Detonation</span>: | ||
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| - Call the elevateAccess REST API endpoint, which assigns the User Access Administrator role at root scope (/) to the current principal | ||
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| Revert: | ||
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| - Remove the User Access Administrator role assignment at root scope (/) | ||
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| References: | ||
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| - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin | ||
| - https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/PrivilegeEscalation/AZT402/AZT402/ | ||
| - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors | ||
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| ## Instructions | ||
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| ```bash title="Detonate with Stratus Red Team" | ||
| stratus detonate azure.privilege-escalation.root-user-access-administrator | ||
| ``` | ||
| ## Detection | ||
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| Identify when the <code>elevateAccess</code> action is called through either the Entra ID Audit Logs or the Azure Activity Log. | ||
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| Sample Entra ID Audit Log entry (sensitive fields redacted), filtering on service <code>Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)</code>: | ||
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| ```json hl_lines="1 3" | ||
| { | ||
| "activityDisplayName": "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources", | ||
| "category": "AzureRBACRoleManagementElevateAccess", | ||
| "loggedByService": "Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)", | ||
| "result": "success", | ||
| "additionalDetails": [ | ||
| { "key": "OperationName", "value": "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action" }, | ||
| { "key": "Resource", "value": "/providers/Microsoft.Authorization" } | ||
| ], | ||
| "initiatedBy": { | ||
| "user": { | ||
| "id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", | ||
| "userPrincipalName": "user@example.com", | ||
| "ipAddress": "1.2.3.4" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ``` | ||
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| Sample Azure Activity Log entry (sensitive fields redacted): | ||
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| ```json hl_lines="2 8" | ||
| { | ||
| "authorization": { | ||
| "action": "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action", | ||
| "scope": "/providers/Microsoft.Authorization" | ||
| }, | ||
| "caller": "user@example.com", | ||
| "operationName": { | ||
| "value": "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action", | ||
| "localizedValue": "Assigns the caller to User Access Administrator role" | ||
| }, | ||
| "status": { | ||
| "value": "Succeeded" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ``` | ||
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| Microsoft Sentinel provides a built-in analytics rule <b>Azure RBAC (Elevate Access)</b> to detect this behavior using the <code>AuditLogs</code> table. | ||
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221 changes: 221 additions & 0 deletions
221
...ternal/attacktechniques/azure/privilege-escalation/root-user-access-administrator/main.go
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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| @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ | ||
| package azure | ||
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| import ( | ||
| "context" | ||
| "encoding/base64" | ||
| "encoding/json" | ||
| "fmt" | ||
| "log" | ||
| "strings" | ||
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| "github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore/policy" | ||
| "github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore/to" | ||
| "github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/resourcemanager/authorization/armauthorization/v2" | ||
| "github.com/datadog/stratus-red-team/v2/pkg/stratus" | ||
| "github.com/datadog/stratus-red-team/v2/pkg/stratus/mitreattack" | ||
| ) | ||
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| // Built-in User Access Administrator role definition ID (constant across all tenants) | ||
| const userAccessAdminRoleDefinitionID = "18d7d88d-d35e-4fb5-a5c3-7773c20a72d9" //TODO: double check this is constant across all tenants | ||
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| func init() { | ||
| const codeBlock = "```" | ||
| stratus.GetRegistry().RegisterAttackTechnique(&stratus.AttackTechnique{ | ||
| ID: "azure.privilege-escalation.root-user-access-administrator", | ||
| FriendlyName: "Elevate to User Access Administrator at Root Scope", | ||
| Platform: stratus.Azure, | ||
| MitreAttackTactics: []mitreattack.Tactic{ | ||
| mitreattack.PrivilegeEscalation, | ||
| }, | ||
| Description: ` | ||
| Elevates the current principal to the User Access Administrator role at root scope (/), | ||
| by abusing the "Access management for Azure resources" capability available to Global Administrators in Entra ID. | ||
|
|
||
| This technique allows a Global Administrator to gain control over all Azure subscriptions and management groups | ||
| in the tenant, enabling arbitrary role assignments across all Azure resources. | ||
|
|
||
| Warm-up: None | ||
|
|
||
| Detonation: | ||
|
|
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| - Call the elevateAccess REST API endpoint, which assigns the User Access Administrator role at root scope (/) to the current principal | ||
|
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| Revert: | ||
|
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| - Remove the User Access Administrator role assignment at root scope (/) | ||
| If you are getting a 403 error when attempting to revert, you may need to refresh your credentials with <code>az login</code> | ||
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| References: | ||
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| - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin | ||
| - https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/PrivilegeEscalation/AZT402/AZT402/ | ||
| `, | ||
| Detection: ` | ||
| Identify when the <code>elevateAccess</code> action is called through either the Entra ID Audit Logs or the Azure Activity Log. | ||
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| Sample Entra ID Audit Log entry (sensitive fields redacted), filtering on service <code>Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)</code>: | ||
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| ` + codeBlock + `json hl_lines="1 3" | ||
| { | ||
| "operationName": "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources", | ||
| "category": "AuditLogs", | ||
| "properties": { | ||
| "category": "AzureRBACRoleManagementElevateAccess", | ||
| "activityDisplayName": "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources", | ||
| "loggedByService": "Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)", | ||
| "result": "success", | ||
| "initiatedBy": { | ||
| "user": { | ||
| "id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", | ||
| "userPrincipalName": "user@example.com", | ||
| "ipAddress": "1.2.3.4" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| ` + codeBlock + ` | ||
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| Sample Azure Activity Log entry (sensitive fields redacted): | ||
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| ` + codeBlock + `json hl_lines="2 8" | ||
| { | ||
| "authorization": { | ||
| "action": "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action", | ||
| "scope": "/providers/Microsoft.Authorization" | ||
| }, | ||
| "caller": "user@example.com", | ||
| "operationName": { | ||
| "value": "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action", | ||
| "localizedValue": "Assigns the caller to User Access Administrator role" | ||
| }, | ||
| "properties": { | ||
| "statusCode": "OK", | ||
| "eventCategory": "Administrative", | ||
| "entity": "/providers/Microsoft.Authorization", | ||
| "message": "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action", | ||
| } | ||
| "status": { | ||
| "value": "Succeeded" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ` + codeBlock + ` | ||
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| Microsoft Sentinel provides a built-in analytics rule <b>Azure RBAC (Elevate Access)</b> to detect this behavior using the <code>AuditLogs</code> table. | ||
| `, | ||
| IsIdempotent: false, | ||
| Detonate: detonate, | ||
| Revert: revert, | ||
| }) | ||
| } | ||
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| func detonate(_ map[string]string, providers stratus.CloudProviders) error { | ||
| ctx := context.Background() | ||
| cred := providers.Azure().GetCredentials() | ||
| clientOptions := providers.Azure().ClientOptions | ||
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| globalAdminClient, err := armauthorization.NewGlobalAdministratorClient(cred, clientOptions) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to create global administrator client: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
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| log.Println("Elevating access to User Access Administrator at root scope (/)") | ||
| _, err = globalAdminClient.ElevateAccess(ctx, nil) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to call elevateAccess: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
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| log.Println("Successfully elevated access: User Access Administrator role assigned at root scope (/)") | ||
| return nil | ||
| } | ||
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| func revert(_ map[string]string, providers stratus.CloudProviders) error { | ||
| ctx := context.Background() | ||
| cred := providers.Azure().GetCredentials() | ||
| clientOptions := providers.Azure().ClientOptions | ||
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| // Get a management token to extract the current principal's object ID | ||
| token, err := cred.GetToken(ctx, policy.TokenRequestOptions{ | ||
| Scopes: []string{"https://management.azure.com/.default"}, | ||
| }) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to get access token: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
| principalID, err := getOIDFromToken(token.Token) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to extract principal object ID from access token: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
| log.Println("Current principal object ID: " + principalID) | ||
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| roleAssignmentsClient, err := armauthorization.NewRoleAssignmentsClient("", cred, clientOptions) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to create role assignments client: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
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| // List all role assignments at root scope (principalId filter is unsupported at root scope) | ||
| // and filter by principal ID and role definition ID in Go | ||
| log.Println("Listing role assignments at root scope (/) for principal " + principalID) | ||
| pager := roleAssignmentsClient.NewListForScopePager("/", &armauthorization.RoleAssignmentsClientListForScopeOptions{ | ||
| Filter: to.Ptr("atScope()"), | ||
| }) | ||
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| for pager.More() { | ||
| page, err := pager.NextPage(ctx) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to list role assignments at root scope: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
| for _, ra := range page.Value { | ||
| if *ra.Properties.PrincipalID != principalID { | ||
| continue | ||
| } | ||
| if !strings.HasSuffix(*ra.Properties.RoleDefinitionID, userAccessAdminRoleDefinitionID) { | ||
| continue | ||
| } | ||
| log.Println("Found User Access Administrator role assignment at root scope, deleting it") | ||
| _, err := roleAssignmentsClient.DeleteByID(ctx, *ra.ID, nil) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete role assignment %s: %w", *ra.ID, err) | ||
| } | ||
| log.Println("Successfully removed User Access Administrator role assignment at root scope") | ||
| return nil | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| return fmt.Errorf("user access administrator role assignment at root scope not found") | ||
| } | ||
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| // getOIDFromToken extracts the object ID (oid claim) from an Azure AD JWT access token | ||
| // without validating the signature, since we already obtained the token from Azure AD ourselves. | ||
| func getOIDFromToken(tokenString string) (string, error) { | ||
| parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".") | ||
| if len(parts) != 3 { | ||
| return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT token format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts)) | ||
| } | ||
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| // JWT uses base64url encoding without padding - add padding as needed | ||
| payload := parts[1] | ||
| switch len(payload) % 4 { | ||
| case 2: | ||
| payload += "==" | ||
| case 3: | ||
| payload += "=" | ||
| } | ||
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| decoded, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(payload) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT payload: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
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| var claims struct { | ||
| OID string `json:"oid"` | ||
| } | ||
| if err := json.Unmarshal(decoded, &claims); err != nil { | ||
| return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT claims: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
|
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| if claims.OID == "" { | ||
| return "", fmt.Errorf("oid claim not found in JWT token") | ||
| } | ||
|
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| return claims.OID, nil | ||
| } | ||
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