Remove ci.yml (pull_request_target with unprotected environment)#62
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Security fix: remove
pull_request_targetworkflowci.ymltriggers onpull_request_targetand uses theauthorize/environment gate to protect a test job holding 6 Google Ads OAuth secrets. But theexternalenvironment has norequired_reviewers(unlike the correctly-configuredtap-bls), so the gate is a no-op.Not currently exploitable (no PR-head checkout → runs trusted base code), but it's a footgun: adding
ref: head.shato 'actually test PRs' would turn it into full secret exfiltration.Per maintainer decision, removing the workflow entirely to eliminate the attack surface. Note: this drops all CI on the repo (build matrix + secret test); a push-only CI can be added back later if desired.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Note
Medium Risk
Removes the repository’s GitHub Actions CI pipeline, which reduces security exposure but also eliminates automated build/test coverage on pushes and PRs.
Overview
Removes the GitHub Actions workflow
ci.yml, eliminating the build matrix and the secret-backed test job that previously ran underpull_request_targetwith an environment gate.As a result, this PR drops all automated CI from the repository (no build or tox test runs via GitHub Actions).
Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 9d6a3e9. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.