diff --git a/src/Handlers/Rules/TimingUnsafeComparisonHandler.php b/src/Handlers/Rules/TimingUnsafeComparisonHandler.php
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..44dbe2ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Handlers/Rules/TimingUnsafeComparisonHandler.php
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+<?php
+
+declare(strict_types=1);
+
+namespace Psalm\LaravelPlugin\Handlers\Rules;
+
+use PhpParser\Node\Arg;
+use PhpParser\Node\Expr;
+use PhpParser\Node\Expr\BinaryOp;
+use PhpParser\Node\Expr\FuncCall;
+use PhpParser\Node\Name;
+use Psalm\CodeLocation;
+use Psalm\Internal\Analyzer\StatementsAnalyzer;
+use Psalm\Internal\Codebase\TaintFlowGraph;
+use Psalm\Internal\DataFlow\DataFlowNode;
+use Psalm\Plugin\EventHandler\AfterExpressionAnalysisInterface;
+use Psalm\Plugin\EventHandler\Event\AfterExpressionAnalysisEvent;
+use Psalm\Type\TaintKind;
+use Psalm\Type\Union;
+
+/**
+ * Detects timing-unsafe string comparisons involving secrets (CWE-208).
+ *
+ * When secrets (values tainted with user_secret or system_secret) are compared
+ * using ===, ==, !==, !=, strcmp(), or strcasecmp(), an attacker can determine
+ * the correct value character-by-character by measuring response time differences.
+ * Use hash_equals() for constant-time comparison instead.
+ *
+ * This handler adds taint sinks at comparison operators and timing-unsafe
+ * functions. When a secret-tainted value flows into these sinks, Psalm emits
+ * TaintedUserSecret or TaintedSystemSecret.
+ *
+ * @see https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/208.html
+ */
+final class TimingUnsafeComparisonHandler implements AfterExpressionAnalysisInterface
+{
+    /** Taint mask for secrets that require constant-time comparison */
+    private const SECRET_TAINTS = TaintKind::USER_SECRET | TaintKind::SYSTEM_SECRET;
+
+    /** Functions that compare strings in a timing-unsafe manner */
+    private const TIMING_UNSAFE_FUNCTIONS = ['strcmp', 'strcasecmp'];
+
+    /** @inheritDoc */
+    #[\Override]
+    public static function afterExpressionAnalysis(AfterExpressionAnalysisEvent $event): ?bool
+    {
+        $expr = $event->getExpr();
+        $source = $event->getStatementsSource();
+
+        if (!$source instanceof StatementsAnalyzer) {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        $taintFlowGraph = $source->taint_flow_graph;
+
+        if (!$taintFlowGraph instanceof \Psalm\Internal\Codebase\TaintFlowGraph) {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        if ($expr instanceof BinaryOp\Identical
+            || $expr instanceof BinaryOp\Equal
+            || $expr instanceof BinaryOp\NotIdentical
+            || $expr instanceof BinaryOp\NotEqual
+        ) {
+            self::addSinksForOperands(
+                $source,
+                $taintFlowGraph,
+                $expr,
+                $source->getNodeTypeProvider()->getType($expr->left),
+                $source->getNodeTypeProvider()->getType($expr->right),
+            );
+
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        // strcmp() and strcasecmp() are also timing-unsafe — they compare
+        // character-by-character and the return value reveals partial ordering
+        if ($expr instanceof FuncCall
+            && $expr->name instanceof Name
+            && \in_array($expr->name->toLowerString(), self::TIMING_UNSAFE_FUNCTIONS, true)
+            && \count($expr->args) >= 2
+            && $expr->args[0] instanceof Arg
+            && $expr->args[1] instanceof Arg
+        ) {
+            self::addSinksForOperands(
+                $source,
+                $taintFlowGraph,
+                $expr,
+                $source->getNodeTypeProvider()->getType($expr->args[0]->value),
+                $source->getNodeTypeProvider()->getType($expr->args[1]->value),
+            );
+        }
+
+        return null;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Add taint sinks for both operands of a timing-unsafe comparison.
+     *
+     * Each operand's data flow parent nodes are connected to a new sink node
+     * that matches user_secret and system_secret taints. If either operand
+     * carries secret taint, Psalm's taint resolution will report the issue.
+     *
+     * @psalm-external-mutation-free
+     */
+    private static function addSinksForOperands(
+        StatementsAnalyzer $source,
+        TaintFlowGraph $graph,
+        Expr $comparisonExpr,
+        ?Union $leftType,
+        ?Union $rightType,
+    ): void {
+        $codeLocation = new CodeLocation($source, $comparisonExpr);
+        $locationId = \strtolower($codeLocation->file_name)
+            . ':' . $codeLocation->raw_file_start
+            . '-' . $codeLocation->raw_file_end;
+
+        self::addSinkForType($graph, $leftType, 'timing-comparison-left', $locationId, $codeLocation);
+        self::addSinkForType($graph, $rightType, 'timing-comparison-right', $locationId, $codeLocation);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Create a single taint sink for an operand and connect all its data flow
+     * parent nodes to it. One sink per operand side avoids duplicate reports
+     * and keeps the taint graph compact.
+     *
+     * The sink matches USER_SECRET | SYSTEM_SECRET, so only secret-tainted
+     * data triggers an issue — ordinary input taint is not affected.
+     *
+     * @psalm-external-mutation-free
+     */
+    private static function addSinkForType(
+        TaintFlowGraph $graph,
+        ?Union $type,
+        string $sinkLabel,
+        string $locationId,
+        CodeLocation $codeLocation,
+    ): void {
+        if (!$type instanceof \Psalm\Type\Union || $type->parent_nodes === []) {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        $sinkId = $sinkLabel . '-' . $locationId;
+
+        $sink = DataFlowNode::make(
+            $sinkId,
+            $sinkLabel,
+            $codeLocation,
+            null,
+            self::SECRET_TAINTS,
+        );
+
+        $graph->addSink($sink);
+
+        foreach ($type->parent_nodes as $parentNode) {
+            $graph->addPath($parentNode, $sink, 'timing-comparison');
+        }
+    }
+
+}
diff --git a/src/Plugin.php b/src/Plugin.php
index b944b4c4..394e5995 100644
--- a/src/Plugin.php
+++ b/src/Plugin.php
@@ -247,6 +247,9 @@ private function registerHandlers(RegistrationInterface $registration, PluginCon
         require_once __DIR__ . '/Handlers/Rules/NoEnvOutsideConfigHandler.php';
         $registration->registerHooksFromClass(Handlers\Rules\NoEnvOutsideConfigHandler::class);
 
+        require_once __DIR__ . '/Handlers/Rules/TimingUnsafeComparisonHandler.php';
+        $registration->registerHooksFromClass(Handlers\Rules\TimingUnsafeComparisonHandler::class);
+
         // Unlike TranslationKeyHandler (which always runs for type narrowing),
         // MissingViewHandler provides no type information — skip entirely when disabled
         if ($pluginConfig->findMissingViews) {
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeHashEqualsSecret.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeHashEqualsSecret.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e47f77e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeHashEqualsSecret.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * hash_equals() provides constant-time comparison — no timing attack.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source system_secret
+ */
+function getExpectedToken(): string {
+    return 'secret-token';
+}
+
+function verifyToken(string $userInput): bool {
+    return hash_equals(getExpectedToken(), $userInput);
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeNonSecretComparison.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeNonSecretComparison.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ce74aac2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeNonSecretComparison.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * Comparing non-secret input with === is fine — no timing attack risk
+ * because the input taint type does not include user_secret or system_secret.
+ */
+function checkRole(\Illuminate\Http\Request $request): bool {
+    return $request->input('role') === 'admin';
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeNonSecretStrcmp.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeNonSecretStrcmp.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d6c081db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/SafeNonSecretStrcmp.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * strcmp() with non-secret input should not trigger a timing issue —
+ * only user_secret and system_secret taint types are flagged.
+ */
+function compareRole(\Illuminate\Http\Request $request): bool {
+    /** @var string $role */
+    $role = $request->input('role');
+    return strcmp($role, 'admin') === 0;
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretIndirectComparison.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretIndirectComparison.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..85d5cb2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretIndirectComparison.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * Indirect flow: secret is assigned to a variable before comparison.
+ * The taint should still propagate through the variable.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source system_secret
+ */
+function getApiKey(): string {
+    return 'secret-api-key';
+}
+
+function verifyApiKey(string $input): bool {
+    $expected = getApiKey();
+    return $input === $expected;
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedSystemSecret on line %d: Detected tainted system secret leaking
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretNotIdenticalComparison.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretNotIdenticalComparison.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..534c04cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretNotIdenticalComparison.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * !== has the same timing characteristics as === — the negation happens
+ * after the byte-by-byte comparison, so it leaks the same timing info.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source system_secret
+ */
+function getExpectedToken(): string {
+    return 'secret-token';
+}
+
+function rejectInvalidToken(string $userInput): void {
+    if ($userInput !== getExpectedToken()) {
+        throw new \RuntimeException('Invalid token');
+    }
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedSystemSecret on line %d: Detected tainted system secret leaking
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretStrcmp.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretStrcmp.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..58d1a448
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretStrcmp.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * strcmp() is also timing-unsafe — it compares character-by-character.
+ * Use hash_equals() instead.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source system_secret
+ */
+function getApiKey(): string {
+    return 'secret-api-key';
+}
+
+function verifyApiKey(string $input): bool {
+    return strcmp($input, getApiKey()) === 0;
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedSystemSecret on line %d: Detected tainted system secret leaking
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretTimingComparison.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretTimingComparison.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bf97c8ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedSystemSecretTimingComparison.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * Comparing a system secret with === is vulnerable to timing attacks.
+ * Use hash_equals() for constant-time comparison.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source system_secret
+ */
+function getExpectedToken(): string {
+    return 'secret-token';
+}
+
+function verifyToken(string $userInput): bool {
+    return $userInput === getExpectedToken();
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedSystemSecret on line %d: Detected tainted system secret leaking
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretLeftOperand.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretLeftOperand.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f72d5434
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretLeftOperand.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * The secret can be on either side of the comparison — both operands
+ * are checked for secret taint.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source user_secret
+ */
+function getUserApiKey(): string {
+    return 'secret-key';
+}
+
+function verifyKey(string $input): bool {
+    return getUserApiKey() === $input;
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedUserSecret on line %d: Detected tainted user secret leaking
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretNotEqualComparison.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretNotEqualComparison.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e4c68e35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretNotEqualComparison.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * != has the same timing characteristics as == — both are timing-unsafe.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source user_secret
+ */
+function getUserPassword(): string {
+    return 'password';
+}
+
+function rejectWrongPassword(string $input): void {
+    if ($input != getUserPassword()) {
+        throw new \RuntimeException('Wrong password');
+    }
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedUserSecret on line %d: Detected tainted user secret leaking
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretStrcasecmp.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretStrcasecmp.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..772127fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretStrcasecmp.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * strcasecmp() is also timing-unsafe.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source user_secret
+ */
+function getSecret(): string {
+    return 'secret';
+}
+
+function verify(string $input): bool {
+    return strcasecmp($input, getSecret()) === 0;
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedUserSecret on line %d: Detected tainted user secret leaking
diff --git a/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretTimingComparison.phpt b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretTimingComparison.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..240f6f9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Type/tests/TaintAnalysis/TaintedUserSecretTimingComparison.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+--ARGS--
+--no-progress --no-diff --config=./tests/Type/psalm.xml --taint-analysis
+--FILE--
+<?php declare(strict_types=1);
+
+/**
+ * Comparing a user secret with == is vulnerable to timing attacks.
+ * Use hash_equals() for constant-time comparison.
+ *
+ * @psalm-taint-source user_secret
+ */
+function getUserPassword(): string {
+    return 'password';
+}
+
+function verifyPassword(string $input): bool {
+    return $input == getUserPassword();
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+%ATaintedUserSecret on line %d: Detected tainted user secret leaking