Daybreak: Restore Equal Sector Quality and Burn Mining Reserve #1238
Replies: 19 comments 60 replies
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There is a blip of FIP discussion by Ancients Research as early as end of 2021, i think, calling for exactly this...
What's the process of getting DC during the 12-month transition? What will the ROI for onboarding CC or DC sectors during the transition look like, roughly, along the head, the middle and the tail? Also would the collateral being returned as VDWM goes down? Would there still be incentives for DC governance to continue their effort when knowing a great chunk of their work load would be gone in 12 month? |
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This is indeed a big gamble |
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cel-feb-2026-filecoin-supply-forecast.pdf seems also relevant in that direction |
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Hey Reiers! I've read through your proposal, and I fully support it. As an investor, I've been worried about the direction Filecoin has been heading for a while now. There's something fundamentally wrong about a network built on the promise of decentralized storage slowly handing control over to a small group of gatekeepers who decide who gets rewarded and who doesn't. That's not decentralization, that's just a new form of centralization wearing a different costume, and to me, centralization is one of the most damaging things that can happen to a blockchain network. It defeats the entire purpose. The whole reason I believe in projects like Filecoin is the principle that no single entity should have that kind of power. When a permissioned layer starts controlling block reward distribution, we've already lost something important, and it needs to be fixed. Burning 283 million FIL is obviously great news for me economically, but honestly that's secondary. What matters most is that this proposal tackles the root problem: the incentives have been broken, the network has shrunk dramatically, and ordinary storage providers have been competing on an uneven playing field. Leveling that field is what actually creates the foundation for real, sustainable growth. I'm rooting for you. I hope this proposal finally gets the support it deserves. Best, |
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I don't usually comment on GitHub, but this one felt worth speaking up about. I've been invested in Filecoin for several years, and honestly there's been a growing frustration sitting in the back of my mind that I haven't been able to fully articulate until I read this. The Fil+ program always seemed off to me, not in theory, but in practice. The idea that a small group of people quietly became the deciding factor in who earns what on a supposedly open network... it just never sat right. I got into crypto because I believe in what decentralization actually means. Not as a marketing angle, but as a real principle, that systems should be open, fair, and not dependent on who you know or whether the right people approve of you. What's been happening with Filecoin is the opposite of that, and watching the network shrink while the same structural problems go unaddressed has been frustrating to watch as an investor. This proposal gets it right. Fix the incentives, remove the gatekeepers, and burn the reserve. Simple, but significant. Thanks for putting in the work to actually move this forward! |
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Thanks @Reiers for writing this and doing the simulation work here! Question: What happens to consensus pledge when a sector gets extended and its QAP is rescaled down during the transition period? More generally, what are the implications for total locked FIL as a result of this change? Is there a risk of ending up with a significantly lower total locked amount? Alternative proposal: Simply give 10x to all newly onboarded sectors. Why? Currently, ~83% of sectors have datacap, meaning they already have 10x power. Giving new sectors 10x and waiting for the existing 1x sectors to fade out could be faster than doing the opposite (i.e., giving a smaller multiplier and waiting for old 10× sectors to fade out, as proposed here), especially because we could also allow 1x sectors to get 10x via snap deals. From a power distribution perspective, the outcome is similar to what this FIP proposes. And as you noted, the multiplier does not increase total block rewards. So I think that at the end of the day, the only difference may be regarding total locked FIL (see my question above). Could this approach ensure we don't decrease total locking while maintaining all the other benefits? |
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First of all, I really appreciate the depth of work that went into this. The analysis, the implementation detail, all of that raises the bar for how we should be discussing core changes to the protocol (you can tell this has leveraged AI AND on top, there are a lot of thoughts put into it separately!). Thank you for putting this together. I think it would be better to split this into two separate FIPs when it comes to execution. Deprecating FIL+ and burning the mining reserve are different issues. They touch different parts of the protocol and they will attract different opinions. If they stay bundled, people who support one but not the other are forced into an all or nothing position. From a governance perspective, separating them would likely make meaningful progress easier. Sunsetting FIL+On the FIL+ side, I am fully supportive of deprecating it. From a protocol perspective At this point, the protocol is effectively paying FIL+ sectors for consensus only. In many cases there is little real service being delivered behind those sectors, yet the network continues to compensate them as if they are providing both storage utility and consensus security. The actual utility data suggests otherwise. We now have better primitives and building blocks. With FIP 0076 landed, FIP 0109, FIP 1220 in progress, and the recent FOC work, developers can build userland onchain storage markets that are driven by real demand. Today FIL+ governance decides what counts as useful service. I would argue that useful service should be defined by external demand. If someone is willing to pay real money for a storage service, and that payment results in additional income for storage providers AND revenue flowing into the Filecoin economy, that is useful service. Those are the activities the network should reward or subsidize. Consensus block rewards should not be used to internally declare something useful. A few of us at FilOz have also been looking at how to deprecate FIL+ safely from a protocol and code perspective — this means we get to a point where miner actor sector weights has no dependency w/ verifreg actor; and eventually deprecating verifreg and maybe datacap actor (datacap actor could still be kept to be used in the userland if useful, however, remove it from core protocol). If this direction gains community support & get move along governance process, we would be happy to collaborate on/support you w/ defining/developing a clean implementation path(TBH we are exploring this anyway and we look forward to simplifying L1 along the way). One technical nuance I would encourage more modeling on is the choice of converging to 1x. Mathematically 1x for all and 10x for all are equivalent in proportional reward terms. However, the majority of sectors today are already effectively 10x, and Filecoin security has a strong collateral component. Reducing overall effective QA could reduce aggregate locking and potentially introduce additional economic or consensus risk. I am not asserting a conclusion, only suggesting this dimension deserves deeper analysis. From a governance perspective I have raised multiple times that i personally treat rkh mechanism as one of the biggest security threats in the filecoin consensus protocol, as these actors have power to impact security parameters w/ near to zero accountability. So remove this "human-in-the-loop" mechanism is a win for the protocol. I also believe FIL+ program has distracted the community focus to build real useful service/tooling/product that can sell Filecoin to something else. I dont doubt FIL+ Program led to some useful tooling built over the years, I just have a hunch the overall ROI is not that high, according to all the network charts. On FIP governance, history shows that proposals like this stall not because of the design but because of process (My last attempt was here #844 (comment) but also didnt make meaningful progress). It would be wise to involve FF governance early and be explicit about the pathway forward so this does not end up in discussion limbo. Burning the mining reserveRegarding the mining reserve burn, I am less convinced it addresses the problem you stated. FIL+ touches the consensus reward redistribution mechanism with a permissioned notary layer influencing block reward allocation. The mining reserve is governed through the FIP process. It is not distributed through notaries and it does not automatically distort block reward allocation. Burning it may be a valid monetary policy discussion, but it does not remove notary gated reward distribution in the same structural sense as removing the multiplier does. Somewhat relevant, there is a project called veFIL proposing leveraging mining reserve to enable some sort of governance token so to enable fileocin has a more effective governance process where token holders may directly engage in. |
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+1 — Strong support for Daybreak.
• 12-month linear ramp-down gives everyone time to adjust • Full grandfathering of existing sectors (no retroactive changes, no gas bombs) • CC sectors immediately jump ~8.5× in daily reward while total network issuance stays mathematically identical • Consensus security actually improves (51 % attack now needs ~17.6 % more real storage) This feels like the right moment to sunset the Fil+ reward subsidy and move genuine data incentives to the application layer (FVM DataDAOs, contracts, etc.). Happy to review the implementation PR once it’s open and run the simulation numbers myself. Ship it. |
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btw. @Reiers 88phnx88/lotus#1 has a working poc for burning the reserve. the code has been tested, the calib net forked with it, works fine |
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If the top-line goal is to encourage usage, then consider how the contradictory transitionary period would be 2.5 years of pain with "legacy people having power" and "new people not". **Alternative proposal: Name="Looking Forward Proposal" **
After 2.5 years, FIL+ dead-code can be removed trivially. A future FIP can either get rid of the multiplier concept and/or reduce locking-fee in some legacy-fair way. |
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Supply-side adjustments like this aren’t unprecedented in crypto. Several networks have burned treasury or reserve tokens to improve long-term economic alignment. If OKB can burn large portions of its reserve supply, it seems reasonable that Filecoin could also consider reducing its unused mining reserve—especially if the objective is to move toward a cleaner, more sustainable token economy. |
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Hi @Reiers I appreciate your intention to "make Filecoin fun again" and the concern that today it feels like a hard labour. I think a lot of it is down to bear market - it always feels like hard work when the market is down. But, as you probably know, that is when a lot of good things are built! On your points regarding difficulty of receiving Datacap: firstly, I would love to know which allocator have you been trying to work with and what was your experience lately. You say that Datacap is hard to get, and yet according to any stats we can measure, the time to data onboarded, on average, is 6-7 days, with leaders taking less than a day. Now, you could say that it is the audit that is causing the delays - the fast allocators run out of datacap and then they need to be reviewed and that is where the delay is. But, again, according to the stats - the average audit time is now 6 days in february - and that accounts for all the back and forth with allocators that appeal etc, so for allocators that have clear reports and take care of their clients it is as little as 2-3 days max. Finally, we have several automated allocators that you could be using, where you need to just prove you are a human and will receive Datacap. You mentioned on the call that you have to turn clients away because you cannot onboard them without Datacap - I symapthize, this is an awful situation. Is it clients that would want to store on Filecoin and would be able to make on-chain payments, or your business model is being part of Filecoin network for running the consensus, while offering a more traditional/off-chain storage services? On the 10x vs 1x conversation, I think there is a point that isn't coming across. There are two, independent issues that people here are pointing out:
SP_old's reward per month is: 1000FIL, meaning over the 2.5 years SP_old will receive 30000FIL So until the full transition is done, you will have a huge discrepancy in how much rewards will old SPs reveive compared to new ones. This will result in very small incentive to onboard storage to Filecoin, and contradict your goals of making CC sector as profitable as filled ones. Also, it I'm not sure it would be 2.5 years - because the sectors onboarded on day 1 of the transition period will keep their 10x, and the ones onboarded 3 months into the transition will keep their 7.75x for the whole time etc etc. But I might be wrong here. In summary, I am not saying that we shouldn't look at making changes to Fil+, FIDL is actively experimenting with an automated Datacap allocation based, where SPs wouldn't need to do any bizdev, and clients don't need to find SPs - instead SPs join a pool, and get deals proposed to them and take on the client data that matches the SLAs they are willing to deliver. All the deals are paid for by the client. We hope that may solve a lot of the issues that we see today, especially that it all runs using Smart Contracts with no human intervention. |
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@Reiers, one more thing - Why do you think burning miner reserve will help? It is not counted in circulating supply and it requires a FIP to use, so there isn't a risk associated with having it, because community will be able to stop any usage that would not be aligned with their goals? |
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With hardware prices skyrocketing right now—and forecasts showing they'll keep rising for the next 1–2 years—current SPs are basically bleeding money and running at a loss. New SPs have almost no incentive to join anymore. The real first thing we need to focus on is how to actually drive up the token's value. |
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I will point to two points 1. I support the recovery reward. 2. It is not recommended to destroy 300 million, because the ratio of capital and team in all shares has increased. |
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The original mining allocation was 70%, not 55%. |
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This is a failed project, we should redesign and develop a new project, let FIL go to 0 |
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This makes it suitable for high-availability, high-performance storage projects, and integrates AI computing. |
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FIP-XXXX: Daybreak — Restore Equal Sector Quality and Burn Mining Reserve
Simple Summary
Gradually reduce the Verified Deal Weight Multiplier (VDWM) from 10× to 1× over 12 months, so all sectors earn equal rewards regardless of deal type. Simultaneously, burn the ~283M FIL mining reserve by transferring it to the burn address
f099.Abstract
FIP-0003 (Filecoin Plus, 2020) introduced a 10× quality-adjusted power (QAP) multiplier for sectors containing verified deals. After five years of operation, the program's outcomes have diverged significantly from its intended goals: Raw Byte Power (RBP) peaked at ~17 EiB in mid-2022 and has since declined to 2.17 EiB; independent community analyses estimate that a substantial portion of verified data may not be retrievable; and a permissioned notary layer has become a gatekeeper for block reward distribution.
This FIP proposes two changes:
Reduce
VERIFIED_DEAL_WEIGHT_MULTIPLIERfrom 10× to 1× over a 12-month linear transition. After the transition, all sectors — committed capacity (CC), regular deals, and verified deals — earn equal quality-adjusted power per raw byte.Burn the mining reserve (~283M FIL as of epoch 5,796,404) by transferring the balance of the reserve actor
f090to the burn addressf099.These changes remove two sources of centralized influence — notary-gated reward distribution and a discretionary token reserve — while preserving or improving storage provider economics. Total block reward issuance is mathematically unchanged.
Change Motivation
Background: Five Years of Debate
The question of whether the 10× quality multiplier helps or harms Filecoin is not new. This FIP builds on years of community analysis and prior proposals:
The prior proposals (particularly FIP-0080) identified the correct problems and proposed the right direction. What they lacked — and what this FIP provides — is the quantitative economic foundation to move from discussion to action: a simulation validated against the protocol specification, gas impact analysis against the builtin-actors source code, a formal security analysis covering five attack vectors, and a fully specified transition mechanism.
This FIP is intended to complement and build upon the work of FIP-0080's authors (Fatman13, ArthurWang1255, stuberman, Eliovp, dcasem, The-Wayvy) and FIP-0093's author (dcasem), whose community advocacy over multiple years laid the groundwork for this proposal.
The 10× multiplier does not increase total block rewards
This is the foundational economic fact.
The Filecoin minting model (defined in the Block Reward Minting section of the protocol specification) has two components:
The critical definition from the spec:
The 10× multiplier is a pure redistribution mechanism. It does not grow the reward pool — it transfers rewards from CC sectors to Fil+ sectors through inflated QAP.
Simulation confirms identical issuance
This result was validated analytically and by numerical simulation. The simulation models 12 scenarios across 10-year forward projections from the current network state.
Chain state at epoch 5,796,404 (source: filfox.info/api/v1/overview):
totalRawBytePowertotalQualityAdjPowercirculatingSupplydailyCoinsMinedactiveMinersKey result — daily issuance is invariant to VDWM:
Identical to 8 significant figures across the full 10-year projection. Not one additional FIL is minted or withheld by this change.
Per-sector economics improve substantially
With VDWM=10, a CC sector competes against Fil+ sectors holding 10× its apparent power. When the multiplier is removed, the same physical storage earns a proportionally larger share of the unchanged reward pool.
Per 32 GiB CC sector at epoch 5,796,404:
Pledge uses the FIP-0081 formula (deployed NV24, Nov 2024): $ConsensusPledge = (1-\gamma) \times SimplePledge + \gamma \times BaselinePledge$ where $\gamma = 0.7$ (fully ramped as of ~Nov 2025).
Under FIP-0081, the consensus pledge Simple component scales with the sector's share of NetworkQAP — when the multiplier is removed, NetworkQAP drops from 18.5 EiB to 2.17 EiB, so each sector's share (and thus its Simple pledge) increases proportionally to its reward increase. The Baseline component is unchanged because$\max(Baseline, QAP)$ evaluates to the baseline in both cases (114.5 EiB >> 18.5 EiB >> 2.17 EiB).
Net effect: Revenue per unit of physical storage increases 8.5×. Pledge also increases (driven by the Simple component), but ROI on pledged capital still improves from ~23% to ~30%. The barrier to entry remains dramatically lower in absolute terms — a CC sector becomes immediately profitable without requiring datacap relationships.
The baseline gap is now structural
The baseline function grows at 100% per year from an initial value of ~2.5 EiB. The network exceeded the baseline from April 2021 through early 2023 — at peak (August 2022), RBP reached ~17 EiB against a baseline of ~10 EiB. During this period, baseline minting operated at full rate.
Since mid-2023, RBP has fallen far below the baseline and the gap widens exponentially:
The baseline now stands at ~114.5 EiB — nearly 7× the historical peak RBP and 53× the current RBP. Even aggressive growth scenarios cannot close this gap. The 10× multiplier was intended to help the network approach the baseline by incentivizing data storage, but the multiplier inflates QAP — and baseline minting depends on RBP.
Our simulation tested baseline growth rates from 0% to 100%/year. Under FIP-0081, the Baseline pledge component (70% weight) uses$\max(Baseline, QAP)$ as its denominator — slowing baseline growth shrinks this denominator and increases that component. However, at current network state, the Simple component (~97% of total consensus pledge) dominates, making baseline growth rate a second-order effect. We propose leaving the baseline growth rate unchanged.
Fil+ outcomes have diverged from intent
FIP-0003 was designed to "incentivize useful storage" via a quality multiplier for verified data. After five years of operation:
These outcomes are well-documented in the 358-comment discussion on FIP-0080 (Discussion #774). This FIP does not seek to assign blame — the Fil+ program was a reasonable experiment that did not produce the intended results. The economic data now provides a clear basis for course correction.
Mining reserve has no distribution mechanism
The mining reserve was allocated 300M FIL at genesis (15% of
FIL_BASE) as a reserve "for funding mining to support growth of the Filecoin Economy, whose future usage will be decided by the Filecoin community."The current balance of
f090is ~282.9M FIL (some tokens were transferred in early network operations). After 5+ years, no mechanism for distribution has been ratified, and FIP-0093 has been in review for approximately 20 months.Burning the reserve:
Specification
1. VDWM Transition
Introduce new constants and a function in the storage miner actor (
actors/miner/src/policy.rsin builtin-actors):Replace the static
VERIFIED_DEAL_WEIGHT_MULTIPLIERconstant with an epoch-aware function:Call sites to modify (in
actors/miner/src/policy.rs):The
epochparameter must be threaded through from the activation, extension, or update context. The two primary call sites are:quality_for_weight()— used during sector activation, extension, and replica updateqa_power_max()— used for maximum power calculations (useVDWM_TRANSITION_TARGETpost-transition)When quality is recalculated:
ProveCommitSectors3,ProveCommitSectorsNI): Usesverified_deal_weight_multiplier_at(activation_epoch).ExtendSectorExpiration2): Recalculated usingverified_deal_weight_multiplier_at(extension_epoch).ProveReplicaUpdates3): Recalculated usingverified_deal_weight_multiplier_at(update_epoch).Grandfathering: Existing sectors retain their original quality until they are extended, updated, or expire. No retroactive quality adjustment is applied. This approach was chosen because:
WindowPoSt: Unaffected. WindowPoSt proves existence of sealed data regardless of deal type and does not invoke
quality_for_weight().2. Mining Reserve Burn
At the upgrade epoch, execute a one-time transfer of the reserve actor's entire balance to the burn address:
After this transfer:
3. FIP-0003 Quality Multiplier Sunset
Upon completion of the VDWM transition (12 months after activation), the quality multiplier mechanism introduced in FIP-0003 will no longer produce differential rewards between sector types. The Fil+ governance infrastructure (notaries, DataCap) may continue to serve application-layer verification and reputation purposes, but will no longer affect protocol-level block reward distribution.
Design Rationale
Why a 12-month linear transition?
The 12-month transition achieves the same end-state as immediate removal while providing:
A 3-year transition unnecessarily extends the period of suboptimal economics.
Why not slow the baseline growth?
Counterintuitively, the growing baseline helps SP economics. Our simulation tested growth rates from 0% to 100%/year with VDWM=1:
Rewards are identical across all growth rates (RBP << baseline in all cases). Under FIP-0081, pledge is dominated by the Simple component (~97% of consensus pledge at current network state), which depends on NetworkQAP rather than the baseline. The Baseline component varies with growth rate but contributes only ~3% of total consensus pledge. The growing baseline keeps this component from increasing.
Why combine VDWM reduction with mining reserve burn?
These two changes are economically independent (no formula contains both variables). Combining them:
Why grandfathering instead of retroactive adjustment?
What makes this FIP different from prior proposals?
This FIP is not a replacement for FIP-0080 — it is the quantitative completion of the work that FIP-0080 began.
Backwards Compatibility
This proposal modifies the built-in storage miner actor and requires a network upgrade.
State migration: Minimal. No structural changes to
SectorOnChainInfoorDeadlineare needed. The quality multiplier is applied at runtime during sector activation, extension, and update. No existing sector state requires migration. The reserve burn is a single balance transfer (~2M gas). This is among the lightest state migrations of any recent core FIP — compare to nv25 Teep which iterated every miner, deadline, and partition.API compatibility:
StateMinerSectors,StateSectorGetInfo, and related APIs return existing quality values for grandfathered sectors and new values for sectors activated after the upgrade. Clients computing QAP should use theverified_deal_weight_multiplier_at(epoch)function for forward calculations.Miner operations: Storage providers do not need to change their sealing pipeline. The quality multiplier is applied automatically by the miner actor. Existing Fil+ workflows can continue — deals will simply not receive enhanced quality after the transition.
Test Cases
Unit Tests
Multiplier interpolation (code values → effective ratio = code_value / QBM):
TRANSITION_START: returns 100 (effective 10×)TRANSITION_START: returns 100 (effective 10×)TRANSITION_START + DURATION/2(525,600 epochs): returns 55 (effective 5.5×)TRANSITION_START + DURATION(1,051,200 epochs): returns 10 (effective 1×)TRANSITION_START + DURATION + 1: returns 10 (effective 1×)CC sector quality is always 1× regardless of VDWM — CC sectors have zero verified weight, so the multiplier has no effect on them. Verify this invariant holds throughout the transition.
Fil+ sector at transition midpoint: QAP ≈ RBP × 5.5 (interpolated effective multiplier).
Sector extension across transition: Sector activated with VDWM=10, extended after transition completes → new QAP = RBP × 1.
Mining reserve burn:
f090) balance → 0 after upgrade.f099) balance increased by former reserve balance.Integration Tests
WindowPoSt unaffected: Prove that WindowPoSt succeeds identically for sectors regardless of when they were activated relative to the transition.
Block reward distribution: Over a simulated transition period, verify total block rewards match the expected minting curve
M(t) = M_S(t) + M_B(t)within rounding tolerance.Pledge calculation: Verify that initial pledge for new sectors uses the interpolated VDWM at the activation epoch.
Cross-FIP interaction:
Security Considerations
A comprehensive formal security analysis accompanies this FIP (full analysis). Five attack vectors were analyzed with quantitative bounds:
Consensus security improves
The minimum physical cost of a 51% consensus attack increases by 17.6%:
53M FIL ($80M)†41M FIL ($61M)†Under the current system, the 10x path requires both datacap access AND higher per-sector pledge (Fil+ sectors have ~1.69 FIL pledge each vs ~1.09 FIL for CC sectors under Daybreak). The pledge capital for the 10x attack is actually higher, but the physical storage requirement is 17.6% lower.
Today, an attacker with datacap access can acquire 51% of consensus power with only 0.944 EiB of physical storage — the 10× multiplier supplies the rest virtually. After Daybreak, 100% of consensus power is physically backed. The primary security improvement is the elimination of 16.3 EiB of virtual consensus power and the 17.6% increase in physical storage required.
F3 fast finality (FIP-0086) provides an additional safety margin by reducing the finality window from 7.5 hours to ~30 seconds.
Flash power attacks are economically irrational
An attacker onboarding sectors during the transition and terminating to extract rewards faces:
Quality arbitrage is bounded and diminishing
Under grandfathering, existing Fil+ sectors retain 10× quality until expiry. The maximum premium is:
$$Premium \leq 9 \times CCRewardRate \times RemainingSectorDays \to 0$$
All grandfathered sectors expire within 3.5 years (FIP-0052). This is the cost of a smooth transition — it is the gradual elimination of existing redistribution, not new value creation.
Mining reserve burn has no protocol interaction
The reserve burn is a one-time balance transfer. No economic formula contains both VDWM and the reserve balance as variables. These changes are mathematically independent.
No new attack vectors
Daybreak leverages existing security mechanisms (pledge, vesting, termination fees, F3 finality) without introducing new security parameters. All analyzed vectors either have negative expected return or show improved security posture compared to the status quo.
Incentive Considerations
Who benefits
Who is affected negatively
Transition timeline
This gradual curve allows market participants to adjust positions. SPs dependent on Fil+ subsidies have 12 months to transition to alternative revenue models: market-rate storage, FVM-based incentive contracts, FOC/PDP warm storage services, or other application-layer mechanisms.
Product Considerations
Impact on existing storage products
The Filecoin Onchain Cloud (FOC) stack — PDP (Provable Data Possession), FilecoinPay, FWSS, Synapse SDK — operates via FVM smart contracts and is independent of the Fil+ quality multiplier. This FIP does not affect those products.
Future deal incentive mechanisms
With VDWM=1 at the protocol level, deal incentives move to the application layer:
This aligns with the design principle of a minimal, neutral base layer that supports diverse application-layer innovation — consistent with the approach taken by Ethereum and other mature L1 protocols.
Implementation
Required changes
filecoin-project/builtin-actors—actors/miner/src/policy.rsverified_deal_weight_multiplier_at(), updatequality_for_weight()andqa_power_max()call sitesfilecoin-project/builtin-actors— system actor upgradefilecoin-project/lotusfilecoin-project/venus,ChainSafe/forestfilecoin-project/specsfilecoin-project/ref-fvmGas impact
The code change adds approximately 200–350 gas per invocation of
quality_for_weight()(46–89 additional WASM instructions at 4 gas each). In context:ProveCommitSectors3(3 sectors)PreCommitSectorBatch2(4 sectors)SubmitWindowedPoStquality_for_weight())CronTickImplementation tracking
filecoin-project/builtin-actorsfilecoin-project/lotusfilecoin-project/venusChainSafe/forestfilecoin-project/specsAcknowledgments
This FIP builds on the work of many community members who have advocated for economic reform over the past several years, particularly the authors of FIP-0080 (Fatman13, ArthurWang1255, stuberman, Eliovp, dcasem, The-Wayvy) and FIP-0093 (dcasem). The extensive discussion in Discussion #774 and Discussion #1030 provided the community context that informed this proposal.
The economic simulation, gas benchmarking, and security analysis were developed with the assistance of AI tools (Anthropic Claude) and GPU compute (NVIDIA RTX 5080, Quadro RTX 6000) to validate mathematical claims against the Filecoin protocol specification and on-chain data. Pledge calculations use the FIP-0081 formula deployed at NV24. All simulation source code, data, and analysis are published for independent verification:
References
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
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